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Notes on Some Implications of
Enlargement of the EEC for Canada
A. R. A. Gherson*
The Treaty of Rome and its phased, step-by-step process of
Community policy-making in agriculture and trade over a period
of 12 years has transformed six individual states of modest size into
a single market of 180 million.' Even before its enlargement the
Community of Six was the largest single importing area in the
world.2 The enlargement of the Community in 1972 was as im-
portant as its establishment, adding a dimension to the Community
as far-reaching for the world economic environment as its creation.
Enlargement of the Community and the accompanying free trade
area arrangements with the remaining countries of Western Eu-
rope almost converts Western Europe into one market. In graphic
terms, when one also takes into account the associated countries of
the Community, 18 under the Yaounde Treaty, three under the
Arusha Treaty, plus what we called the British Commonwealth As-
sociables, the enlarged Community and its free trade arrangements
represents 50% or more of world trade in terms of its constituent
parties.' One might call it a combination of the Roman and British
Empires.
Let me now point to some of the implications enlargement has
had for Canada. First, Canada, of all of the enlarged Commu-
nity's trading partners, stands to sustain the greatest burden of ad-
justment. For example, about 80% of Canada's exports to the
* Counsellor (Economic), Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.
1 The populations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands total 186,367,043. UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, Table 19,
at 71 (1973).
2 In 1971, the EEC imported goods worth $95.10 million; the United States imported
goods worth $45.08 million; and Canada imported goods worth $14.68 million [in
U.S. dollarsJ. Id., Table 147, at 406.
3 The following countries are signatories of the Yaounde Treaty: Madagascar, Bur-
undi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory
Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo,
Upper Volta and Zaire. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda compose the signatories of the
Arusha Treaty.
The British Commonwealth Associables and countries connected to the EEC by free
trade arrangements are as follows: England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Ire-
land, Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.
Thus, the enlargement of the EEC and the accompanying free trade arrangements
results in the association, to some extent, of 38 nations.
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United Kingdom used to enter duty-free. With British entry, about
one half of these exports are now subject to a higher, external
Community tariff; whereas, the United States and Japan, by and
large, get a "windfall" benefit. This arises from the fact that in
the industrial sector the MFN level of tariff in the United Kingdom
is generally higher than the common external tariff; thus, the United
States and Japan will have better access to the British market. In
contrast, Canada will have worse access to the British market and
face a reverse preference against its exports from the original six
members of the Community.
Prior to the creation of the enlarged Community, Canada was in
a position to compete with each of the member countries in the
world market for industrial products. On the basis of a market of
20 million people, Canada could develop economies of scale which
enabled it to compete against countries whose markets were of the
same order of magnitude or up to twice Canada's size; but, as the
industrial revolution and mass production methods have shown in
the United States, a large domestic market generates economies of
scale which enable you to compete far more successfully against
producers with a smaller domestic market. Now Canada faces a
large market in Europe of 253 million people [the population of the
enlarged EEC countries] and it is debatable whether Canada can in
fact develop the economies of scale required to compete effectively
against the Community in its own market and in world markets.
Hence, Canada attaches great importance to a successful round of
multilateral trade negotiations to ease the process of adjustment and,
by improving Canadian access to world markets, to develop the
economies of scale necessary for successful competition at home and
abroad.
Another implication of enlargement is its impact on the institu-
tional arrangements for cooperation. Let us consider the GATT.
The GATT is premised on the principle of MFN and non-discrimi-
nation. With enlargement and related arrangements, about one
half of world trade will be linked by a preference. It is almost
an irony that the preference which is diametrically opposed to the
MFN principle enshrined in the GATT may be a more effective in-
strument for the liberalization of trade. Secondly, with enlarge-
ment of the Community and the emergence of Japan as the second
industrial nation in the western world, American relations with these
two major trading entities have taken on a new dimension. They
now form three super-economic power groupings. They are in a
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class by themselves, if only because of three criteria: size of market,
GNP and industrial capacity. In terms of population, USA has
207 million; EEC 255 million; and Japan, 105 million. In terms
of GNP, USA has $1.2 or $1.3 trillion; EEC $693 billion; Japan
$220 billion. Canada, with a population of only 21 million and a
GNP of about $105 billion, is not in that league. This disparity,
therefore, raises the question of whether the collective security sys-
tem built since the war for orderly trade relations will continue to
function with the existence of a triumvirate of super-economic pow-
ers. It may well be argued that when these three super powers are
able to act in concert to liberalize trade, the benefits are immea-
surable; but, conversely, if they are not in concert, the losses can be
equally immeasurable and immedate. This reveals Canada's vul-
nerablity. Take for example, August 15, 1971: the United States
faced an awesome balance of payments deficit and instituted a
series of corrective measures directed, in the main, at the Commu-
nity and Japan; but, by virtue of the fact that 70o of Canada's
exports are with the United States,4 Canada was affected the most.
As I mentioned earlier, Canada has a fundamental stake in in-
ternational cooperation and that is why it has pledged its support to
the new round of multilateral negotiations in Geneva and to the
discussions for the reform of monetary rules, which will provide the
necessary elements for liberalization of trade to generate higher
levels of economic growth, employment and prosperity. The last
thing Canada wants to see is a repetition of August 15, 1971.
Canada may now be moving from economic growth to quality
growth, from unlimited exploitation of resources to resource and
supply management and from increasingly higher standards of liv-
ing to improving the quality of life and environment.
Canada is blessed with abundant natural resources. In this pres-
ent conjuncture of events, Canadians attach great importance to re-
pairing and strengthening the fabric of international economic in-
stitutions for cooperation. I am sure you have often heard that Ca-
nadians no longer wish to be hewers of wood and drawers of water.
Canada has the highest growth rate in the labour force of any in-
dustrialized society of the West,5 and is therefore committed to de-
veloping a diversified, sophisticated and viable industrial economy
4 See statement by James A. Coutts, supra note 5.
5 See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 1972 YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS
(32 ed. 1972).
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to absorb this labour force and sustain the cost of an expanding
service sector.
Canadians are also committed to trade. Exports represent be-
tween a quarter and a third of Canadian GNP; over 50%l of what
Canada produces is exported.6 There is also a political need for in- -
creasing Canadian participation in Canada's economic development.
Canadian trade policy, foreign investment policy, industrial sector
policies, regional economic development policy, competition policy
and even immigration policy are all being oriented towards the ob-
jective of Canadian participation. But, Canada wants to do this
within the framework of international cooperation involving partic-
ularly the United States, the EEC and Japan - the major indus-
trialized powers and Canada's major trading partners.
8See statement by James A. Coutts, supra note 3.
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